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“HUMESPEAK”: THE SDLP, POLITICAL DISCOURSE,
AND THE NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE PROCESS
P. J. McLoughlin*
Abstract
This paper explores the vital role played by the Social Democratic and
Labour Party (SDLP) in the formulation of a new political discourse and
conceptual approach to the Northern Ireland problem. In particular, it
shows how John Hume, party leader through the 1980s and 1990s, helped
to propagate this discourse, and in doing so influenced policy-making in
London and Dublin, and thinking within the republican movement.
Although the paper emphasises the importance of this influence, it
concludes by considering the reasons why the Ulster unionist community
have remained so unreceptive to the political discourse of Hume and the
SDLP.
Introduction
This article examines the political discourse of Northern Ireland‟s
SDLP. In doing so, it aims to show that many of the concepts and themes of
the SDLP‟s discourse helped to shape the ideological parameters of the
Northern Ireland peace process. In this, the article is limited in its scope.
Clearly, a great number of actors have contributed to the discourse and
ideology of the Northern Ireland peace process, and there is not room here to
explain the way that the SDLP‟s ideas have interacted with those of other
parties to the conflict. In particular, changes in northern Irish nationalist
thinking – many of which have involved the SDLP – have both fed upon and
fed into similar shifts in southern Irish nationalist ideology. As such, whilst
the focus here is in on the SDLP, the party should be considered as part of
the wider Irish nationalist “family”. Accordingly, this article is intended as a
contribution to the wider literature on the evolution of Irish nationalist
discourse. For the SDLP‟s discursive and ideological innovations must be
seen as related to and interactive with changes in the language of other
members of the broader nationalist family.1
In order to draw out the SDLP‟s role in this complex process, the
article focuses on a select number of concepts which were particularly
common to the party‟s discourse from the 1970s through to the 1990s. It
does not claim that these concepts were completely unique to the SDLP, and
indeed aims to show that other actors were often thinking in similar ways.
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However, the article explains how the party deployed these concepts in a
consistent, almost idiosyncratic fashion, a style which served to make such
ideas part of the SDLP‟s own distinctive language and ideological approach
to the Northern Ireland problem. In turn, it shows how some of the SDLP‟s
particular word formations were adopted by other parties to the problem, and
thus became integral to the language of the Northern Ireland peace process.
In doing so, the paper lays great emphasis on the role of John Hume, leader
of the SDLP from 1979 to 2001. Such was Hume‟s importance in the
propagation of the SDLP‟s ideas that his distinctive political parlance even
earned it own epithet: “Humespeak”. Though this term was often used
disparagingly – referring to the repetitiveness of his language – even critics
recognise the extent to which Hume‟s particular phraseology has dominated
the discourse of the peace process (Cunningham, 1997; McGovern, 1997).
The specific concepts which the paper examines are “the three strands”,
“the Irish dimension”, “the two traditions”, and finally the notion of “an
agreed Ireland”. Whilst exploring each of these terms individually, the paper
aims to show that they are interrelated, and together form a mode of political
discourse distinctive to the SDLP. Having considered these concepts, and the
extent to which they influenced the thinking of the British and Irish
governments, the paper then looks at a specific debate which took place
between the SDLP and the republican movement from the late-1980s. This
dialogue, revolving around the issue of British interests in Northern Ireland,
proved crucial to the evolution of republican thinking, and the subsequent
Irish Republican Army (IRA) ceasefire of August 1994. In this respect, the
etymological origins of the peace process can again be related to the SDLP,
and in particular to the party‟s leader in this period.
The Three Strands
As Gerard Murray‟s meticulous study of the SDLP has shown, a three-level
approach towards the resolution of the Northern Ireland conflict was
conceived by the party as early as 1971 (1998, pp. 15-16), that is a over a
quarter of a century before the 1998 Good Friday Agreement (GFA) created
a political settlement by the same means. This approach was initiated by
John Duffy, one of the SDLP‟s earliest policy-makers, in a set of internal
party papers which he completed in September 1971. Duffy‟s papers
described three sets of relationships which he felt must be addressed in order
to resolve the Northern Ireland problem: relations between the two
communities in Northern Ireland; relations between the North and South of
Ireland; and relations between Britain and Ireland (Murray, 1998, p. 15).
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It was only in the 1980s, however, that this three relations thinking
became evident in the SDLP‟s public discourse. Arguably, this reflected the
political developments in this period, which created a context more
favourable to the three relationships approach. In particular, the warming of
relations between the British and Irish governments, culminating in the
Anglo-Irish Agreement (AIA) of 1985, appeared to broaden the framework
within which the Northern Ireland problem was being considered. This met
with positive response from the SDLP, with Hume telling the British House
of Commons that the AIA provided
[for] the first time … a real framework within which to address the
problem. The problem is not just about relationships within Northern
Ireland ... it is about relationships in Ireland and between Britain and
Ireland (Hansard, sixth series, vol. 87, col. 780).
Through the remainder of the 1980s, Hume continued to articulate this
three relationships approach as the most appropriate way to resolve the
Northern Ireland problem. His persistence, it seems, eventually paid off.
Indeed, for when the Northern Ireland Secretary, Peter Brooke, announced
his intention to convene political talks between the local parties in March
1991, he told the House of Commons that “discussions must focus on the
three main relationships: those in Northern Ireland … among the people of
the island of Ireland; and between the governments” (Hansard, sixth series,
vol. 188, col. 765).
By the time the Brooke talks began, the three relationships had been
rebranded as “the three strands” by British officials. However, the origins of
this approach in the thinking of the SDLP were plain to see. Moreover, when
Brooke was replaced by Patrick Mayhew in April 1992, the new Northern
Ireland Secretary continued to organise inter-party talks in accordance with
the three strand model. Although these discussions ended with little progress,
when negotiations recommenced in 1996, again they were based upon the
three strands. Eventually, the talks concluded in April 1998 with the
announcement of the GFA. This Agreement established new political
institutions to accommodate the two communities in Northern Ireland; new
arrangements to facilitate co-operation between the North and South of
Ireland; and new structures to co-ordinate relations throughout the UK and
Ireland.2
The particular design of the political institutions created under each
strand of the GFA were, of course, the result of bargain and compromise
between the Northern Ireland parties and the British and Irish governments
(see Hennessy, 2000). However, that the GFA was drawn from the three
strands schema shows how the SDLP shaped the basic terms of the
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settlement. For, as demonstrated, the three strands approach finds its origins
in documents written by the party in the early 1970s. The three-level thinking
of these documents, promoted more vigorously by the SDLP from the 1980s
onwards, shows the significant influence which the party had in creating the
essential parameters of the peace agreement that emerged in 1998.
The Irish Dimension
“The Irish dimension” is a term which the SDLP used to refer to the need for
a political settlement which extended beyond Northern Ireland, involving the
Irish as well as the British state. In this respect, the concept ties in with the
party‟s three relationship thinking, and particularly the emphasis on relations
between the North and South of Ireland. For the SDLP, political linkages
between the two jurisdictions were required to give institutional expression
to the identity of Northern Ireland‟s nationalist community. Just as the
British identity of the Ulster unionist community was reflected in the Union
with Great Britain, so, the SDLP argued, the Irish identity of the northern
nationalist community must be recognised through political structures
connecting it with the Republic of Ireland. As Hume reasoned:
Any solution which does not take account of the Irish dimension is
doomed to failure. SDLP policies clearly commit the Party to a solution
that takes account of both basic loyalties in the community and both
must be taken into account if any solution is to be found (Irish News,
22 May 1975).
The party‟s emphasis on the need for an Irish dimension to any
settlement of the Northern Ireland problem has led the term to become very
much associated with the SDLP. However, the phrase was actually first used
in a British government document, The Future of Northern Ireland: A Paper
for Discussion (1972). Here the term was used to suggest that any regional
settlement
must also recognise Northern Ireland‟s position within Ireland as a
whole … Whatever arrangements are made for the future
administration of Northern Ireland must take account of the region‟s
relationship with the Republic of Ireland (HMSO, 1972, paras. 76, 78).
The SDLP read this as an acceptance by the London government of the
arguments advanced in Towards a New Ireland – a document which the
party had issued a month before the British discussion paper. In Towards a
New Ireland, the SDLP had firmly set its face against any internal solution to
the Northern Ireland problem: “Any re-examination [of constitutional
arrangements] must therefore take place, not in a purely Six County3 context,
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but in an Irish context” (SDLP, 1972, p. 1). In this, the SDLP made clear that
it would not be party to a settlement that did not involve the Irish
government in some way. As such, when London seemed to accept this
position by recognising an “Irish dimension” to the problem in The Future of
Northern Ireland, the SDLP seized upon what was actually a Whitehall term
(Irish News, 8 November 1972), adopting the phrase as part of its own
political nomenclature, and using it henceforth.
The Irish dimension found its first institutional expression in the
Council of Ireland which formed part of the failed Sunningdale Agreement
of 1973. Like the North-South structures created by the GFA 25 years later,
the Council of Ireland was intended to promote co-operation between the two
parts of the island. However, whereas the all-Ireland institutions of the GFA
were sharply defined, the powers and political remit of those agreed in 1973
were more open to interpretation. For this reason, many unionists opposed
the Council of Ireland, believing that it would work to erode the Irish border,
and undermine Northern Ireland‟s position within the UK. This concern
ultimately led to the collapse of the Sunningdale Agreement, and the intercommunal power-sharing government which it had created for Northern
Ireland.
Because unionist opposition to Sunningdale had been directed mainly
towards the Council of Ireland, following the Agreement‟s demise, the
London government moved away from the idea of an institutionalised Irish
dimension. The feeling amongst British officials was that the Council of
Ireland had been a step too far for unionists. Had the Sunningdale settlement
involved only a power-sharing arrangement within Northern Ireland, it may
have survived. The SDLP, on the other hand, remained firmly opposed to
any internal settlement of the Northern Ireland problem, arguing that this
would deny the political identity of the nationalist community. Even in the
immediate aftermath of Sunningdale‟s collapse, the party responded
vigorously to media speculation that this might lead to a weakening of the
SDLP‟s commitment to North-South institutions. “The Irish dimension is
fundamental to SDLP policy”, argued Austin Currie, a co-founder and
leading member of the party: “Whether or not it is realised in a Council of
Ireland or any other structure is a matter for discussion” (Irish Times, 19 June
1974).
Through the political inertia of the late 1970s and early 1980s, the
SDLP continued to hold to this line, insisting that the Irish government‟s
involvement in Northern Ireland was a sine qua non of any settlement to
which it would be a party. In defending this position, the SDLP used the term
“the Irish dimension” so frequently that, as suggested, the phrase came to be
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considered as one of party‟s own. Even the British government – at this time
looking to distance itself from the whole notion of an Irish dimension –
appeared happy to forget that the phrase had first appeared in one of its own
discussion papers. But whilst the term was invented in Whitehall, the idea of
an Irish dimension was integral to the SDLP‟s thinking – as was evident in
the party‟s earliest political documents (Murray, 1998, pp.12ff). Moreover,
by continually using a phrase coined by British officials, the SDLP made it
impossible for the Irish dimension to slip from the political agenda. By
refusing to contemplate any settlement which did not involve the Irish
government, the SDLP effectively vetoed any movement by London towards
an internal solution of the Northern Ireland problem – an option obviously
favoured by the unionist community.
Of course, the Dublin government was also crucial in pushing the Irish
dimension. In particular, in the early 1980s, the administrations of Garret
FitzGerald carefully avoided any anti-partitionist rhetoric, but insisted that
Dublin should play some role in the administration of Northern Ireland. An
Irish presence in the structures of governance in the region, it was argued,
would serve to address the sense of political alienation that had become
apparent amongst the nationalist minority in this period (FitzGerald, 1991,
pp. 473ff). As such, it was not only the SDLP‟s obstinacy over the Irish
dimension, but also the Dublin government‟s insistence that it should be
involved in Northern Ireland, and indeed the sympathy for this position
among the international community, particular in the US, that together
pushed the British government towards the logic of the 1985 AIA. Under the
terms of this accord, Dublin was given a limited but nonetheless significant
role in the governance of Northern Ireland. More than a decade after
Sunningdale‟s demise, the Irish dimension was restored.
Although the 1998 GFA ostensibly “transcended” the AIA, the
essential architecture of the earlier accord remains in place. Despite unionist
opposition, the inter-governmental institutions of the AIA were reformed
rather than replaced by the GFA (O‟Leary, 2001, p. 68). The SDLP had some
influence in this decision, with the party still opposed to any settlement
lacking an Irish input. However, more important was opinion in London and
Dublin. In essence, the two governments were unwilling to abandon the
political machinery which had, since the mid-1980s, allowed for far more
effective management of the Northern Ireland problem. As such, under the
terms of the GFA, Dublin retains the role it has held since 1985, as guardian
of the nationalist minority‟s essential interests. This, in addition to the new
North-South structures created by the GFA, shows that the Irish dimension is
still in effect.
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The role in Northern Ireland which the Dublin government acquired
through the AIA, and the position which it continues to hold today, is less
than the SDLP would have liked. In 1985, the party had been hoping for
something closer to joint British-Irish sovereignty over Northern Ireland. In
1998, the SDLP had sought North-South structures with greater political
potential, institutions which could have evolved with more dynamism,
leading ultimately to the reunification of Ireland. However, the Irish
dimension to both the AIA and the GFA owes much to the SDLP‟s refusal to
accept anything less than the British government had originally offered in its
1972 discussion paper.
The Two Traditions
The idea of “the two traditions” – or the same concept articulated in different
terms – appeared in nationalist commentaries some years before the onset of
the Northern Ireland conflict. Indeed, John Whyte highlights the 1950s in
particular as a period in which mainly southern writers such as Michael
Sheehy and Donal Barrington began to consider the problem of partition in
terms of “two distinct peoples in Ireland” (Whyte, 1990, pp. 119-20). In this
interpretation, partition was not imposed upon Ireland by the British
government, but a rather an inevitable response by London to the seemingly
irreconcilable differences of these two “peoples”: Irish nationalists and
Ulster unionists. Implicit in this thesis was the idea that it was for the
“peoples” of Ireland – with the emphasis being on nationalists – to work to
overcome those differences. This, it was suggested, was the only way to end
partition and unite Ireland.
Following the outbreak of communal violence in Northern Ireland in
the late 1960s, and the formation of the SDLP in 1970, the new party clearly
drew upon these ideas, articulating a gradualist approach towards Irish unity
as the ultimate solution to the conflict.4 However, the party also used this
discourse of divided peoples – or “the two traditions” as it became in the
SDLP‟s phraseology – in explaining its immediate proposals for the
pacification and stabilisation of Northern Ireland. For this end, the SDLP
argued, could only be achieved by establishing political structures which
recognised the identity of both political “traditions” in Northern Ireland, Irish
nationalist and Ulster unionist (SDLP, 1972, p. 4; 1974a, para. 1.3). In
essence, this meant creating an Irish dimension – that is all-Ireland political
structures – as a counterbalance to the pre-existing British dimension –
namely the political Union between Great Britain and Northern Ireland. As
the party plainly stated in its 1975 manifesto: “There is an Irish Dimension to
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the problem. There is a British Dimension to the problem. Any solution must
take account of both” (SDLP, 1975, p. 3).
In effect, then, the SDLP used this two traditions thesis to support its
arguments in favour of an Irish dimension. This tendency was most notable
in the period after Sunningdale‟s collapse. At this time, many commentators
proposed that the SDLP abandon its pursuit of an Irish dimension, and
content itself with an internal settlement of the Northern Ireland problem –
this, it was claimed, being the only basis on which unionists might be
persuaded to share power with the nationalists. The SDLP rejected such
suggestions, arguing that without institutional recognition of its Irish
identity, the nationalist minority could not be accommodated within the
Northern Ireland state (SDLP, 1974a, paragraphs 1.1-1.3). The two traditions
thesis thus provided the ideological rationale for the party‟s continued
commitment to the Sunningdale formula of power-sharing and an Irish
dimension. As Hume reasoned:
Partnership between our two traditions – both within the North through
power-sharing, and between North and South through the Irish
dimension – accepting and respecting our differences will in time build
trust and confidence to replace distrust and prejudice (Sunday Press, 16
March 1975).
In the late 1970s, such arguments made little headway with either the
unionist community or the British government. Buoyed by their defeat of
Sunningdale, from 1974 onwards, unionists became increasingly inflexible.
Not only did they remain opposed to the idea of linkages between the North
and South of Ireland, but unionist leaders now refused to share power with
the SDLP even within a wholly internal political arrangement. The British
government, meanwhile, was unwilling to enforce a settlement upon an
intransigent majority, and so appeared to abandon all hope of establishing a
local settlement in Northern Ireland. Instead it settled into the role of ruling
the region directly from Westminster. This seemed to appease the unionist
community. After all, direct rule from London secured the majority‟s
essential political objective, maintenance of the Union with Britain. The
nationalist community, on the other hand, grew increasingly disaffected.
Recognising this, the SDLP continued to press for a change in British policy
towards an arrangement that would acknowledge the identity of both
communities. As Hume argued:
The problem here cannot be solved on the basis of one identity alone
and whether wittingly or unwittingly, British politicians run the risk of
promoting violence in the North by not accommodating the two
different identities in it (Irish News, 9 May 1978).
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The extent of the minority community‟s alienation became apparent in
the early 1980s, when republican prisoners began a series of hunger strikes in
order to gain political recognition from the British government. The hunger
strikes mobilised even moderate sections of the Catholic community, those
who had shown no previous sympathy for the republican movement. In turn,
this led to fears in both London and Dublin that the moderate nationalism of
the SDLP would now be eclipsed by the radical republicanism of Sinn Féin
(Bew, Gibbon and Patterson, 2002, p. 202).
It was partly to restore the credibility of the SDLP that the Taoiseach,
Garret FitzGerald, established the New Ireland Forum of 1983-4. This
initiative, originally proposed by the SDLP (Murray, p. 124), 5 brought the
northern nationalist party into conference with its southern counterparts,
Fianna Fáil, Fine Gael, and the Labour Party. Although contemporary
commentators derided the exercise as attempt by the Irish establishment to
“save” the SDLP, the party had ambitions beyond its electoral struggle with
Sinn Féin. It hoped to use the Forum to forge an ideological consensus
among constitutional nationalists in both parts of Ireland, creating a unity of
purpose that would, along with the goodwill of the international community,
press the British government into action on Northern Ireland (Hume, 1984, p.
24). The SDLP‟s success in achieving such consensus was evident in the
conclusion of the New Ireland Forum report, which committed all of the
participating parties to the two traditions thesis as the basis for a solution:
The validity of both the nationalist and unionist identities in Ireland …
must be accepted; both of these identities must have equally
satisfactory, secure and durable, political, administrative and symbolic
expression and protection (Dublin Stationery Office, 1984, article
5.2.4).
Although the 1985 AIA did not adopt any of the specific political
structures that were proposed by the New Ireland Forum, it certainly drew
upon the thinking behind the initiative. As Todd argues:
Explicitly, the AIA recognized the need to acknowledge the rights of
the two traditions in Ireland and to … recognize the identities of the
two communities in Northern Ireland …
The implication, when the AIA is read in the light of the New Ireland
Forum Report, is that the nationalist community in Northern Ireland as
a part of the wider Irish nationalist tradition has a right to the
institutionalized recognition of its identity … through the involvement
of the Irish government in Northern Ireland (1995, p. 822).
The same political logic and discourse informed the terms of the
Northern Ireland peace process from its earliest days. This was clear to see in
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the Joint Declaration for Peace – or the Downing Street Declaration (DSD)
as it is more commonly known – which formally launched the process in
December 1993. Here the British government promised to work with its Irish
counterpart to
encourage, facilitate and enable the achievement of … an agreement
over a period through a process of dialogue and co-operation based on
full respect for the rights and identities of both traditions in Ireland
(HMSO, 1993, para. 4).
In the 1995 Framework Documents – wherein the two governments
provided the blueprint for a political settlement in Northern Ireland – the
influence of the two traditions discourse was even more evident in the
stipulation that “any new political arrangements must be based on full
respect for, and protection and expression of, the rights and identities of both
traditions in Ireland” (HMSO, 1995, para. 10 (iv)). Finally, the GFA was
also suffused with a language with recognised the equal legitimacy of the
two political traditions in Ireland (see the Agreement, Constitutional Issues,
para. 1(v-vi)).
All of these references show the extent to which the two traditions
discourse became ingrained within the philosophy of the peace process.
However, again this mode of thought can be related to ideas first expressed
by the SDLP in the 1970s. Although the party was itself drawing on southern
nationalist commentaries from the 1950s, the SDLP modified this thinking to
reflect the contemporary situation in Northern Ireland. Specifically, the party
developed practical proposals which – though based upon the rethinking of
the 1950s – were not geared solely towards Irish unification, and in fact
provided a conceptual framework within which Irish nationalist and Ulster
unionist could both be accommodated in a still partitioned Ireland. In
addition, it was the SDLP‟s frequent and repeated use of a specific term, “the
two traditions”, that led to its subsequent adoption by the British and Irish
governments, and thus its establishment as a central discourse of the peace
process
An Agreed Ireland
Of all the concepts considered in this paper, the idea of an “agreed Ireland” is
the one most intimately associated with Hume. However, it also relates to the
concepts already discussed, particularly the two traditions thesis. Indeed, the
idea built directly upon this thesis, suggesting that the two political
communities in Ireland had to find mutually acceptable constitutional
structures that would allow them to co-exist on the island which they shared
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– hence an agreed Ireland. Like the two traditions thesis, the concept of an
agreed Ireland also became more prominent within the SDLP‟s discourse in
the aftermath of the failed Sunningdale Agreement, when the party tried to
argue the validity of the power-sharing and Irish dimension formula which
unionists had rejected (see SDLP, 1974b). However, it also appeared that
Hume employed the phrase, an agreed Ireland, as a way to sate or at least to
address the traditional nationalist desire for a united Ireland. For he used the
term to suggest that any settlement which gave the two communities in
Northern Ireland an equal say in the governance of the region, and any
agreement which allowed nationalists to express a political affiliation with
the southern Irish state, would in itself constitute “Irish unity”. For example,
speaking shortly after the collapse of Sunningdale, Hume argued that:
If we get an agreed Ireland that is unity. What constitutional or
institutional forms such an agreed Ireland takes is irrelevant because it
would represent agreement by the people of this country as to how they
should be governed (Irish Times, 17 June 1974).
This was an idea which Hume continued to articulate, ad infinitum,
from the 1970s onwards. But whilst unionists vehemently opposed the allIreland implications of his thinking, Hume‟s arguments did eventually find
favour with the two governments. This was most apparent in the DSD of
1993, where the British government stated that its primary interest was “to
see peace, stability and reconciliation established by agreement among all the
people who inhabit the island,” and committed itself to “work with the Irish
Government to achieve such an agreement … based on full respect for the
rights and identities of both traditions …” (HMSO, 1993, para. 4). With this,
Hume‟s notion of an agreed Ireland became the ideological template for a
solution to the Northern Ireland problem (Bew, Gibbon and Patterson, 2002,
pp. 221-2). Though broadly flexible as to the particular political structures
that would be created, this model provided two guiding principles to the
subsequent inter-party talks. Any solution arising from these discussions
would have to include all-Ireland institutions, and must win the consent of
both political traditions.
The agreement that eventually emerged in 1998 is consistent with this
model. Indeed, with the North-South structures created by the GFA, northern
Catholics no longer reside in a polity entirely separate from that of their conationals in the Republic of Ireland. The minority community‟s Irish identity
is explicitly recognised by the Agreement (Agreement, Constitutional Issues,
para. 1(vi)). By the same token, the Union between Great Britain and
Northern Ireland remains intact; unionists‟ political identity has in no way
been diminished. In this, the GFA has created a political framework capable
Peace and Conflict Studies • Volume 15, Number 1

- 105 -

“Humespeak”: The SDLP

of accommodating both traditions on the island of Ireland. Hume‟s
contribution to the conception of this framework, and in particular his idea of
an agreed Ireland, was highly significant.
“No Selfish Strategic or Economic Interest”
Having explored four major concepts which contributed to the discourse and
thinking of the Northern Ireland peace process, it is now worth considering
the particular political exchanges which led to the cessation of hostilities in
the mid-1990s. For here again, we can see the influence of the SDLP,
particularly in the verbal formulations that were used.
Of crucial importance was the dialogue between the SDLP and Sinn
Féin which began in 1988. This debate was, in the first instance, inspired by
the two parties‟ rival interpretations of the 1985 AIA. Sinn Féin saw the
Agreement as an imperialist stratagem: by allowing Dublin a limited role in
the administration of the region, republicans felt that London was trying to
stabilise British rule in Northern Ireland (Sinn Féin, 1986). The SDLP,
however, saw the AIA in quite a different light. In particular, Hume focused
on Article 1(c) of the Agreement, wherein the British government had
promised to support and indeed legislate for a united Ireland if this was
shown to be the wish of a majority within Northern Ireland. Hume presented
this commitment as, effectively, a declaration of British neutrality on the
future of Northern Ireland. With this, he sought to overturn republicans‟
imperial interpretation of the conflict:
This is a clear statement by the British government that it has no
interest of its own, either strategic or otherwise, in remaining in Ireland.
It is a declaration that Irish unity is a matter for Irish people, for those
who want it to persuade those who don‟t (Hume, 1986, p. 382).
Publicly, Sinn Féin rejected Hume‟s reading of the AIA. But behind
closed doors, a debate was taking place within the republican movement.
After the astonishing electoral gains of the early 1980s, Sinn Féin had
reached a ceiling in its political support. This was partly attributable to the
AIA, which has restored the confidence of constitutional nationalism, but
more important was Sinn Féin‟s relationship with the IRA. Whilst it
continued to defend the actions of the IRA, Sinn Féin found that it could not
win significant support beyond the republican heartlands, where Catholic
voters remained loyal to the SDLP. If Sinn Féin was to have any influence
beyond its core constituency, it would have to engage with its moderate rival.
Recognising this, the Sinn Féin leader, Gerry Adams, began to put out
political feelers towards the SDLP (Adams, 2003 pp. 53ff.)
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In spite of the risks involved, Hume finally agreed to formal talks with
Sinn Féin, beginning in early 1988. In essence, the SDLP used these
discussions to restate and refine its reading of the AIA, and in particular its
view that the British government was now neutral on the possibility of Irish
unity. As Hume argued in a letter delivered to Adams at the outset of the
talks: “Britain is now saying that she has no interest of her own in being here
and that her only interest is to see agreement among the people who share the
island of Ireland” (Hume, 1988, p. 4). For the SDLP, therefore, the British
government was not the primary obstacle to Irish reunification. Rather it was
the unionist community, and their deep-rooted resistance to that end. Thus,
the key to achieving a united Ireland was to persuade unionists to consent to
it.
Despite such arguments, throughout the 1988 talks, Sinn Féin
stubbornly rejected the idea of British neutrality on Northern Ireland, and
restated their old colonial interpretation of the conflict:
The claim that Britain is neutral ignores their role as a pawnbroker and
guarantor of unionist hegemony … Britain‟s continuing involvement in
Ireland is based on strategic, economic and political interests (Sinn
Féin, 1988, p. 12).
Although the SDLP-Sinn Féin talks appeared to end in stalemate,
Hume took what republicans had said here as a challenge (Hume, 1996, p.
115). He now turned to London, seeking confirmation – straight from the
horse‟s mouth as it were – of his conception of the AIA and of British
neutrality vis-à-vis Irish unity. Peter Brooke, the Northern Ireland Secretary
from 1989, proved receptive to Hume‟s approaches, and took seriously his
suggestion that the republican leadership was becoming more open-minded
(Mallie and McKitterick, 1996, pp. 107-8). Brooke responded in a speech to
his Westminster constituency on November 9th 1990, in which he famously
declared that: “The British government has no selfish strategic or economic
interests in Northern Ireland” (Irish Times, 10 November 1990). The striking
similarities between this formula and the terms in which Sinn Féin had
rejected the SDLP‟s neutrality thesis seem more than coincidental. It appears
that someone was telling Brooke exactly what republicans needed to hear a
British minister say.
Following Brooke‟s speech, Hume was able to return to Adams
claiming vindication of his interpretation of the AIA. This led to further talks
between the two leaders which evolved into the so-called “Hume-Adams
initiative”. The essential purpose of this initiative was to find agreement on a
form of words – acceptable to the British and Irish governments, but also to
the republican movement – which would be included in a joint LondonPeace and Conflict Studies • Volume 15, Number 1
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Dublin declaration regarding the terms on which Sinn Féin could join allparty talks towards a settlement in Northern Ireland. Though understandably
unnerving Ulster unionists, the Hume-Adams dialogue achieved huge
support throughout nationalist Ireland, and eventually forced the two
governments to respond with the DSD of December 1993 (Mallie and
McKittrick, 1996, pp. 117ff.).
The phraseology of the DSD stands as a testament to the extent to
which the document drew upon the Hume-Adams initiative, despite
presentation to the contrary (Bew, Patterson and Teague, 1997, pp. 205-6). In
order to maintain unionist support for the process, the two governments
could not be seen to adopt a text which Adams had any part in creating, the
Sinn Féin leader being seen as a terrorist in Protestant eyes. But though the
terms of the Hume-Adams dialogue were diluted, the primary inspiration for
the DSD was plain to see. Most significant in the text was an affirmation of
the position given by Brooke three years previously, the British government
declaring that it had “no selfish strategic or economic interest in Northern
Ireland”, and thus represented no barrier to a united Ireland achieved by
peaceful means (HMSO, 1993, para. 4).
After considerable deliberation with the republican movement, the IRA
eventually responded to the DSD by calling a ceasefire in August 1994. The
DSD, of course, was not the sole reason for this shift in strategy. Indeed, the
republican movement had for some years been moving towards a more
political approach (English, 2003, pp. 187ff).
Moreover, if any one explanation can be given for the cessation of the armed
campaign, it was the realisation that, though the IRA could no be defeated,
neither did it have the military capacity to force the British state from
Northern Ireland. By the late 1980s, many senior republicans had accepted
this reality. However, persuading the movement as a whole to abandon the
armed struggle and adopt a purely political strategy was no easy task. Crucial
in the process were the various statements regarding British interests in
Northern Ireland that were made in the early 1990s. These allowed the Sinn
Féin leadership to suggest that there had been a radical shift in British policy
towards Northern Ireland, and that this should be tested by republicans‟ also
changing tack.
On this level, the early peace process appeared as a game played
essentially between the British state and the republican movement. However,
as demonstrated, Hume and the SDLP helped to write the script for the
crucial first exchanges between the two sides. Prior to the SDLP-Sinn Féin
talks of 1988, republicans appeared unwilling to even entertain the idea of
British neutrality regarding Northern Ireland. But as well as creating such
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thoughts amongst the Sinn Féin leadership, Hume prompted the British
government to make public announcements that would encourage the
acceptance of such ideas amongst the wider republican movement. These
statements proved vital to the development of the Northern Ireland peace
process. In particular, without the “no selfish strategic or economic interests”
mantra repeated by British officials throughout the early 1990s, there would
have been no IRA ceasefire in 1994, and no peace agreement in 1998.
Conclusion
The great historical legacy of the SDLP, and of John Hume in
particular, lies in redefining Irish nationalism. I deliberately do not say
Northern nationalism, as I believe the SDLP has radically changed the
thinking of the mainstream political parties in the South, as well as the
broad mass of constitutional nationalist thinking in both North and
South. Not only do I make that wider claim, but I also further claim
that the SDLP has radically changed the thinking of physical force
nationalism or republicanism as well. (Maginness, 2002, p. 33)
Notwithstanding the ostentatious nature of this assertion – and indeed
despite the fact that it is made by a member of the SDLP – it has credibility.
With its birth in August 1970, the SDLP became the primary political
expression of the reformist tendencies that emerged within northern Irish
nationalism in the 1960s. Throughout the 1970s, the party consolidated this
position by articulating a discourse and approach to the Northern Ireland
problem that departed significantly from traditional anti-partitionist
nationalism. Even in this early period, the SDLP enjoyed considerable
influence within Irish government circles, but the real breakthrough came
with the New Ireland Forum of 1983-4. With this, the party had opportunity
to fully imbue the southern state with its political philosophy (Murray, 1998,
pp. 123, 141), and hereafter successive Irish governments adopted a
distinctively SDLP phraseology. In turn, the London government also took
on something of the SDLP‟s discourse. This was evident in the AIA of 1985,
and even more so the DSD of 1993, after which the two governments were
united in their use of a lexicon at least partly conditioned by the terminology
of Hume and his party. However, as Maginness points out, the SDLP also
helped to change the thinking of physical force republicanism. Clearly, it was
aided in this effort by the willingness of the British government to confirm
the arguments which the party had made to Sinn Féin. But looking at the
particular formulations which figures such as Peter Brooke chose to use, it
seems that by the early 1990s Hume had established a direct line of
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communication with the Northern Ireland Office, which was listening with
great interest.
There is, however, one party to the Northern Ireland conflict who have
proved impervious to “Humespeak”. Ulster unionists have retained a
particular distrust for Hume and his discourse. Cunningham suggests that
this is a result of the perceived ambiguities in Hume‟s political language.
Demonstrating his point, Cunningham provides a quotation from a Protestant
clergyman which he suggests “neatly encapsulates criticisms that have been
levelled at John Hume”:
Protestants are really puzzled by what they feel is the ambiguous
attitude of Catholics and their failure to define ordinary concepts in a
clean, straightforward way … Protestants sometimes find it very
difficult to understand the sophistry, the playing with words which we
(sometimes) get from Catholics (Cunningham, 1997, p. 13).
Perhaps the best example of such “sophistry” is Hume‟s “agreed
Ireland”. For many unionists, this phrase provided the “verbal sleight of
hand” by which Hume disguised his true ambition (Bew and Patterson, 1985,
p. 99). Put simply, an agreed Ireland was Humespeak for a united Ireland.
(O‟Brien, 1994, p. 177). However, the unionist reading of Hume‟s agreed
Ireland underestimates the extent to which the concept allowed Irish
nationalists, and particularly northern Irish nationalists, to accept a political
settlement which fell short of a united Ireland. It did so by promising
constitutional arrangements with an all-Ireland dimension, structures which
allowed northern nationalists to feel some form of political association with
the Irish Republic, the state which best represented their national identity. At
the same time, an agreed Ireland offered the same for unionists – that the
institutions created would respect their rights and identity, and would require
their consent. This, at its most basic level, is what Hume‟s agreed Ireland
was all about. It was an attempt to square the circle between Irish
nationalism and Ulster unionism, to provide political structures which would
satisfy both. With the GFA, this Herculean task may have been
accomplished. The 1998 Agreement has, for the first time in Irish history,
created institutions which have secured widespread acceptance amongst both
political traditions on the island.6 The GFA has achieved an agreed Ireland,
and Hume and the SDLP have played no small part in this.
Endnotes
*

I would like to acknowledge the support of the Irish Research Council for
the Humanities and Social Sciences in carrying out this research. I am also
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grateful to Jennifer Todd and the editors for their constructive comments. All
errors are my own.
1

An appreciation of the SDLP‟s place within the wider process of change in
Irish nationalist discourse can be gained by reading this piece in conjunction
with the article by O‟Donnell in this volume, and those by Hayward (2004),
Ivory (1999), and Shirlow and McGovern (1998).
2
For an overview of the different institutions of the GFA, see O‟Leary
(2001).
3
Northern Ireland comprises six of the 32 counties of Ireland. However,
Irish nationalists have traditionally used the term “the six counties” as a
means to delegitimise the Northern Ireland state. The implication is that the
“six counties” are only a part of what would be a more “natural” political
unit: a 32 county united Ireland.
4
For a detailed discussion of this thinking, see McLoughlin (2006).
5
FitzGerald had been thinking in similar terms, but modified Hume‟s idea of
a convention of Irish nationalist parties to one which would, at least in
principle, be open to Ulster unionist contributions (FitzGerald, 1991, pp.
462ff.). FitzGerald and Hume were alike in much of their political thinking,
and their convergence over the New Ireland Forum initiative shows just one
example of the overlap and interplay between revisionist nationalist
tendencies in both parts of Ireland. 6
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“six counties” are only a part of what would be a more “natural” political
unit: a 32 county united Ireland.
4
For a detailed discussion of this thinking, see McLoughlin (2006).
5
FitzGerald had been thinking in similar terms, but modified Hume‟s idea of
a convention of Irish nationalist parties to one which would, at least in
principle, be open to Ulster unionist contributions (FitzGerald, 1991, pp.
462ff.). FitzGerald and Hume were alike in much of their political thinking,
and their convergence over the New Ireland Forum initiative shows just one
example of the overlap and interplay between revisionist nationalist
tendencies in both parts of Ireland.
6
Exit polls suggested that the GFA won only a slim majority of support
among the unionist community in the 1998 referendum. Unionists‟
traditional aversion to power sharing with nationalists was clearly
exacerbated by the prospect of republicans also participating in the
government of Northern Ireland. Following this, the failure of the IRA to
decommission its weapons, allied to instances of continued republican
paramilitary activity and Sinn Féin‟s refusal to accept new policing
arrangements in Northern Ireland, saw unionist backing for the GFA fall
further. However, more recently, the resolution of these issues appears to
have assured unionists of republicans‟ commitment to purely democratic
methods. Accordingly, most sections of the Protestant community have now,
if not embraced, at least accepted the GFA as providing the most equitable
solution for the stable governance of Northern Ireland.
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